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The Development 
of the Black Lung Act
Until early in the twentieth century, an employer's liability 
for compensating an employee who was disabled as a result 
of a workplace injury was determined in a civil action. 1 
Similarly, the survivor of an employee killed on the job was 
entitled to compensation from the employer only as a result 
of winning a law suit. In either case, it was the claimant's 
burden to prove that the employer had been negligent, 
thereby causing the disability or death of the worker. 
Demonstrating negligence was no simple matter, as 
employers could rely on several potent lines of defense. 
Delays of several years in reaching some final judgment were 
commonplace, legal expenses were perceived as substantial, 
and decisions often appeared to be capricious. Even as 
claimants began winning more judgments at the turn of the 
century, a few large awards were made to some claimants 
while others received nothing.
Considerable pressure for reform grew during the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Rather than seek to modify 
the system of tort law, proposals started to build on a 
relatively new approach to compensating injured workers 
and survivors that had recently spread across much of in 
dustrialized Europe. Known as workmen's compensation, 2 
the system appeared to represent a significant improvement 
for workers—and possibly for employers as well—in Ger 
many, England and some other western European nations.
2 Development of the Act
Beginning with Wisconsin and New York State in 1911, the 
various states began to adopt their own workers' compensa 
tion laws, thereby replacing the existing tort approach.
As each state enacted such a law, considerable variation 
appeared in terms of the administration of the system, 
coverage, benefits, insurance arrangements and so on. All 
the laws seemed to conform, more or less, to certain underly 
ing principles, however. First, each system operated on a no- 
fault basis so that claimants no longer needed to prove 
employer negligence. Benefits were to be paid for disability 
or death "arising out of and in the course of employment," 
a phrase found in all of the state laws and closely mimicking 
language in the various European states. The no-fault 
feature of the laws led to the hope that compensation would 
be paid swiftly and with little or no controversy and litiga 
tion. Benefits were to be paid in proportion to the wages 
earned by the employee prior to disability or death. As a 
kind of quid pro quo, each of the state laws made workers' 
compensation the "exclusive remedy" of workers or sur 
vivors against their employers. Thus, employers became 
obligated to provide benefits under this new scheme, but 
they freed themselves of the threat of possible law suits by in 
jured employees or their survivors.
As the states administered their workers' compensation 
laws, a number of difficulties emerged in the matter of 
claims for occupational diseases. 3 A common problem was 
the need to establish the cause of the disease that disabled or 
killed a worker. Another cause of dispute between claimants 
and defendants often involved the question of whether or 
not disease was even present. Contention could arise also 
over the identification of the disease itself, since the presence 
of one disease rather than another might be more likely to be 
found compensable by those administering the compensa 
tion system.
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Until 1969, the compensation of workers or their survivors 
for industrial injuries or diseases had been left entirely to 
state governments in the United States. 4 Since the federal 
government played virtually no direct role in the employer- 
employee relationship at the time states began enacting these 
laws, there was no question that if workers' compensation 
laws were to be developed, they would be left in the hands of 
the states. Federal legislation in this area prior to the 
mid-1930s would almost certainly have been declared un 
constitutional. As each state refined its own unique system 
of compensation, and as various interests arose that depend 
ed upon that system, any potential role for the federal 
government seemed to diminish. Yet despite its historic inac 
tivity, in 1969 the federal government shifted from its 
historic position and passed legislation to provide compensa 
tion to a specific class of workers—coal miners—for a single 
specific occupational disease. The purpose of this chapter is 
to explain how that change occurred.
The Nature of the Coal Mining Industry
Several factors set coal mining apart from other industries 
as a source of employment. These differences are due to a 
variety of special circumstances surrounding this work. One 
of coal mining's special, though not unique, characteristics is 
the physical risk of harm associated with it. The industry has 
been widely regarded as dangerous. Best known perhaps are 
the large-scale disasters where scores of miners have died in a 
single accidental occurrence. Yet the nature of the work also 
contributes to smaller scale or individual incidents that lead 
to death or disability. For example, in the period 1926-30, 
the fatality rate in coal mining was almost 2 per million man- 
hours of work. 5 Assuming a 2,000 hour work year, about 1 
worker in 250 would die in a mining accident each year. 
Though the rate had fallen to 0.84 fatalities per 1 million 
man-hours by 1969, the rate was still high—about 1 fatality
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annually for every 600 miners employed full time, or a rate 
7-9 times greater than that for the entire employed 
workforce. 6 Recognition of the dangers was widespread.
A second characteristic of mining is its isolation, both 
geographically and culturally, from other areas of the na 
tion. Coal is mined, generally, in remote regions that are 
rarely, if ever, seen by people from the more populated parts 
of the country. This implies that coal mining is more than 
simply an occupation. Instead, it represents a form of society 
that was not touched by developments in the balance of the 
nation for much of this century. Set apart in this way, miners 
have often been subject to different treatment and standards 
by government.
A third characteristic of mining is the secular decline that 
gripped the mining economy during the 1960s. Coal produc 
tion that had been at 631 million tons in 1947 fell to below 
500 million tons per year during the early 1960s and had not 
exceeded 560 million tons per year by 1969. Moreover, in the 
later years of this period, less coal was being taken from the 
more labor-intensive underground mines and, instead, was 
surface-mined. Surface mining was found primarily in the 
middle west and western states, meaning that mining in Ap- 
palachia was even more adversely affected. The price of 
domestic coal, measured in constant dollars, fell in most 
years from 1947 to 1969, and by 39 percent overall during 
this period. 7
The changing sources of coal, along with its displacement 
by other forms of energy, had a tremendous impact on 
employment in the industry. Between 1950 and 1970, 
employment in coal mining declined by 70 percent, from 
483,000 to 144,000." In addition to the decline in the quantity 
of coal demanded and the relative shift to surface-mined 
coal, the sharp increase in labor productivity in below- 
ground mines contributed to the drop in employment (see 
table 1-1).
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Table 1.1 






















































































SOURCE: The President's Commission on Coal, Staff Findings, March 1980, p. 47.
6 Development of the Act
One of the results of all this change in the economics of 
coal mining was the severity of conditions for miners and 
their families. With little or no other employment alter 
natives in the coal mining areas, long-term unemployment 
and poverty were endemic there. The economic deterioration 
of the coal mine regions created a sense that a great injustice 
had been perpetrated against the miners. The difficulty that 
many of these workers had in being able to relocate into 
totally different types of employment resulted in very slow 
rates of mobility out of these depressed regions. Those per 
sons who remained behind but had no work were those with 
the greatest handicaps in the labor market: limited skills, ad 
vanced age, or health problems.
The economic difficulties of both the individual miners 
and the regions created financial difficulties for unions also. 
Since the United Mine Workers' Welfare and Retirement 
Fund was largely financed by a royalty based on coal ton 
nage paid by the mine owners, revenues were inadequate to 
meet the growing demands placed upon them by increasing 
health care costs and increasing retirement rates. Conse 
quently, the fund was forced to reduce or eliminate certain 
benefits during the 1950s and 1960s, including some that 
were formerly provided to disabled miners or to survivors of 
miners. 9
The Federal Role in Coal Mine Health and Safety
It has been observed here already that one of the things 
that sets coal mining apart from other industries is its 
physical dangers. What role has government, at any level, 
played in attempting to reduce the risks of coal mine employ 
ment?
As early as 1865, a bill was introduced in Congress to 
create a Federal Mining Bureau. However, it was only after a 
series of disasters that the Bureau of Mines was created
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within the U.S. Department of the Interior in July of 1910. 10 
The Bureau was charged with ". . .diligent investigation of 
the methods of mining, especially in relation to the safety of 
miners. . . ." n The act did not provide the Bureau any in 
spection authority. Indeed, the law explicitly denied all 
Bureau employees any right or authority in connection with 
the inspection or supervision of mines. Part of the Bureau's 
difficulty was remedied in Title I of the Federal Coal Mine 
Safety Act of 1941, which authorized the Bureau to make in 
spections and publicize its findings and recommendations. 
The Bureau was unable, however, to set safety standards, an 
area previously left to the states.
During a period of serious labor-management strife in 
1946-47, the federal government operated a substantial por 
tion of the country's coal mines. The government used its 
opportunity as an employer during this period to have In 
terior Secretary Krug reach an agreement with United Mine 
Workers president John L. Lewis on a federal Mine Safety 
Code. When the industry was returned to private ownership 
in 1947, the code became a guideline (but not a standard) for 
federal inspectors. Operators were free to comply or not. 
Mine operators and state mine agencies were asked (in 1947 
in PL 328) by the federal government simply to report on the 
extent of compliance with the guidelines. Seventeen of the 
coal mining states cooperated fully in reporting, two others 
responded partially, and seven states did not cooperate to 
any extent.
In December 1951, an explosion in a coal mine in West 
Frankfort, Illinois, killed 119 miners. In the wake of the 
disaster, President Truman signed PL 552 in 1952, which 
made compliance with the Mine Safety Code mandatory in 
mines employing 15 workers or more. Federal inspectors 
were given the right to shut down dangerous mines. Subse 
quently, several efforts were made both to tighten up mine
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safety provisions and to eliminate the exclusion from 
coverage of the smaller mines (14 or fewer miners), including 
a bill that passed in the Senate but not in the House in 1960. 
It was only in 1966 that PL 89-376 accomplished these goals.
The shared responsibilities of federal and state inspectors 
created obvious administrative problems. The federal role 
was aimed at averting large-scale disasters. The states* safety 
responsibilities dealt more with practices and conditions that 
could involve injury or death to individual miners. Aside 
from federal-state differences, substantial interstate varia 
tions existed in inspection policies and standards.
Workers' Compensation for Coal Miners
For an industry with the great physical risks of coal min 
ing, it is not surprising that workers' compensation has 
always been an important issue. With the enactment of the 
state laws, miners injured or killed in mine accidents had 
recourse to state workers' compensation programs in order 
to secure some indemnity and health care benefits. While 
benefits may have been short of generous, they were not dif 
ferent systematically from those available to workers in 
other industries. 12 However, the widely shared perception 
was that workers who were disabled or the survivors of those 
killed by dust diseases had little or no access to workers' 
compensation benefits.
The two states with sizable populations of miners that did 
provide compensation for coal mine dust diseases before 
1969 were Pennsylvania and Alabama. In the former, 
benefits were provided under a distinct program for miners 
with pneumoconiosis and were lower and less favorable in 
several respects than benefits available under the regular 
workers' compensation law. A benefit ceiling of $75/month 
was set on the program. Under the special program enacted 
in Pennsylvania, about 25,000 miners received some com-
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pensation for coal workers' pneumoconiosis from January 
1966 through early in 1969. 13 In Alabama, 1,318 cases of 
coal workers' pneumoconiosis were compensated between 
1962 and 1966. 14 It was very difficult for coal miners to 
receive workers' compensation benefits for dust diseases in 
West Virginia, though some did for silicosis. Only in 1969 
was the workers' compensation law there liberalized for dust 
diseases in coal workers.
In the late 1960s, little interest in workers' compensation 
programs had surfaced at a national level. 15 Concerns re 
garding state programs were not evident, especially in regard 
to the arcane matter of compensation for occupational 
disease. This was not the case, however, at the state level, 
particularly in West Viriginia, which was in a state of fer 
ment. A grass roots movement that began to coalesce among 
the miners in 1968 had begun to move for (better) compensa 
tion for dust diseases suffered by coal miners. A series of 
resolutions was introduced at the United Mine Workers of 
America (UMWA) convention in 1968 by various local 
unions. They won endorsement easily from the convention. 
The issue had been given high visibility in West Virginia, par 
ticularly through the efforts of three physicians who worked 
closely with the miners there: Isadore Buff, a cardiologist; 
Donald Rasmussen of the Appalachian Regional Hospital in 
Beckley, West Virginia; and H. A. Wells.
Following the convention, negotiations occurred between 
the UMWA and the customary coalition of mine operators 
over a new labor-management contract. In early October 
1968, the first nationwide strike in 16 years was called by the 
union, and an agreement followed on October 14, 1968. The 
new contract provided a number of improvements in wages 
and fringe benefits over the three years of the new contract, 
but it did not contain any new language regarding either 
safety or compensation for occupational disease. The 1968
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contract was consistent in this respect with a long history of 
UMWA contracts that had concentrated on wages and fringe 
benefits of working miners, but showed little concern with 
issues of safety or occupational health. The "business as 
usual" practice by the union displayed some insensitivity to 
concerns regarding compensation and safety on the heels of 
the interest demonstrated by the membership at their con 
vention less than five weeks prior to the signing of the new 
collective bargaining agreement. The issues of safety and 
health might have disappeared or been forgotten except that 
the Farmington disaster followed so closely on the heels of 
this new contract.
Concern about dust diseases and compensation for them 
was generated by the three West Virginia doctors and also by 
Ralph Nader. At the local level, interest was also stimulated 
and spread by young activists who had been drawn to Ap- 
palachia as VISTA workers (Volunteers in Service to 
America), or in a variety of Great Society antipoverty pro 
grams established primarily under the Office of Economic 
Opportunity. Believing that economic and social injustice 
had led first to disease and then to economic deprivation ow 
ing to the lack of compensation, these young persons provid 
ed both the energy and organizational skills that allowed 
local Black Lung Associations to be formed and to grow. 
The union was not considered an ally. Instead, it was 
perceived as a part of the same establishment that paid little 
or no attention to the plight of sick miners or their survivors. 
The black lung movement during 1968 must be understood 
to have been driven by a dynamic that was more than in 
dependent of the UMWA; in large measure it was hostile to 
the union and seen as a source of political threat to the union 
leadership.
The three physicians appeared in coal mining communities 
throughout West Virginia. Dr. Buff warned his audience
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that they all had black lung disease and that they would die 
from it. 16 Buff traveled with a pair of lungs that he showed 
to his audiences. Dr. Wells would participate in the same 
program, holding up dried, black tissue sections that he 
claimed were ". . .a slice of your brother's lungs." 17
In January of 1969, a large rally was held by black lung 
advocates at the Charleston Civic Center to focus attention 
on the issue. In addition to the trio of physicians, Con 
gressman Ken Hechler (D-W. Va.) spoke to the group and 
read a long letter sent by Ralph Nader. The targets for much 
of the rally were the mine operators, the medical establish 
ment that did not acknowledge black lung as a disease, and 
the union, for its apparent lack of interest in issues of health 
and safety and compensation. The breach between much of 
the union's leadership and the miner activists of the black 
lung movement can be understood in terms of the political 
divisions that were operative in the UMWA at this time and 
the eventual challenge to the Tony Boyle presidency. 18
Although black lung legislation had been proposed in the 
West Virginia legislature that session, by February 1969 no 
action had been taken. At this time a series of wildcat strikes 
in southern West Virginia had spread quickly through other 
mine fields in the state. The original causes of the strike are 
in dispute but the issue that prompted its widening was the 
demand by miners for black lung legislation. As the strike 
spread, miners traveled to Charleston to let state legislators 
know that they wanted an improved compensation law. 
Bringing enormous pressure on the governor and state 
legislators, the miners marched through the city, ringed the 
legislature, threatened continued shutdowns of the mines 
and eventually pushed through legislation that liberalized 
workers' compensation for coal miners with dust diseases. 
Only after Governor Arch Moore signed the legislation did 
most of the state's coal mines reopen in early March 1969.
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The role played by the UMWA in the West Virginia black 
lung strike was a passive one at best, and actually was seen as 
less than supportive by the activists in the black lung move 
ment. One reason given by the UMWA for its role was that it 
had sought federal rather than state legislation to deal with 
problems of safety, health and compensation. By being an 
inactive party in the black lung strike in West Virginia, the 
union unwittingly had allowed a dissident group to emerge 
that could challenge its leadership. Thus the UMWA was 
forced into a more active role in the development of federal 
legislation.
The Development of the Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969
On November 20, 1968 an explosion occurred in a huge 
mine (subsequently described by some as the size of Manhat 
tan Island) owned by the Consolidation Coal Company at 
Farmington, West Virginia. In a year that recorded 309 
fatalities in the coal mines in 13 different states, 150 of which 
were in West Virginia alone, two things made Farmington 
different. First, the magnitude of the toll from a single acci 
dent exceeded anything that had occurred since the West 
Frankfort, Illinois disaster in 1961. Of the 99 miners under 
ground at the time of the explosion, 78 were entombed when 
the mine was sealed 10 days after the blast. Second, the pro 
longed process of search and rescue lent itself to massive 
media coverage. Farmington became subject to nightly re 
porting on the network news. Very extensive coverage was 
given to the story in The New York Times and other national 
press. Coal mine safety was not simply an issue for the coal 
mining states any longer. A strong sense developed, spurred 
by the attention given to this community, that something had 
to be done for the miners to assure their safety in the 
workplace.
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There is little dispute that the Farmington disaster was the 
catalyst that moved Congress to act. A widely shared goal in 
the Congress was to enact improved coal mine safety legisla 
tion within a year of the date of the Farmington explosion. 
The political environment guaranteed that the public's revul 
sion regarding the death toll in the mines would have to be 
assuaged. Lyndon Johnson's administration had proposed 
stricter mine safety legislation prior to this disaster. Farm 
ington assured that something would be done. The physical 
danger of coal mining combined with a sense of economic 
hardship, if not injustice, assured that some federal action 
would be forthcoming.
In speaking on the floor of the Senate, the feeling was well 
summarized by Senator Williams:
The active miner of today who toils manfully deep 
in the bowels of the earth to produce about 15 tons 
of coal per day was, until recently, the forgotten 
man, but the tragedies of the past year and one-half 
have raised him high in the eye of the public. The 
people of this Nation have been shocked by these 
unfortunate events and have demanded, on his 
behalf, that government and industry do a great 
deal more—not just half-way measures—to im 
prove his lot. The active miner of today is feeling 
the wonderful benefits that an aroused public can 
bestow on him. The bill before the Senate today 
(S.2917) is a tribute to this public awareness. 19
The legislation that eventually emerged as the federal Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (PL 91-173) was 
directed at improving the safety of coal mining by enlarging 
the role of the federal government in setting standards and 
inspections. The tragedy at Farmington was treated as the 
last straw that compelled the federal government to extend 
its jurisdiction into areas previously left to the states. Early
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versions of the legislation that was to work its way through 
the Congress made no mention of occupational disease, 
compensation or pensions for disabled miners or widows of 
miners. By all accounts, the portion of the law that dealt 
with these matters arose as an afterthought by some, in the 
process of drafting and redrafting the health and safety law.
Within three months of the Farmington disaster the Sub 
committee on Labor of the Senate's Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare opened hearings on coal mine health and 
safety legislation. Harrison Williams of New Jersey in 
troduced a bill that embodied the views of the United Mine 
Workers. Senator Javits of New York proposed a bill that 
had support from the Nixon administration. Jennings Ran 
dolph of West Virginia also put forward a proposal. On July 
31, 1969, a bill that earlier had been reported out of the sub 
committee won approval of the Committee. The bill's focus 
was on prevention and contained no mention of compensa 
tion.
The obvious response by the Congress to Farmington was 
to legislate tighter safety standards and possibly deal with 
health issues as well. Any dissatisfaction with compensation, 
an area administered traditionally by a state government, 
was not a federal concern. Yet the success of the black lung 
movement in West Virginia would be harder to replicate in 
the other coal-producing states. The mood in Congress was 
one of seeking to demonstrate some sensitivity to the plight 
of the miners and their families. The UMWA leadership 
needed some legislative victories to validate its tactics to its 
own rank-and-file.
In September 1969, S 2917 was brought to the floor of the 
U.S. Senate by Senator Williams. It contained no reference 
to compensation. The first person to raise the issue publicly 
on the Senate floor was Senator Byrd (D-W. Virginia). 
Senator Williams responded that a "short-term program"
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could be handled "temporarily" by amending the bill direct 
ly on the Senate floor. The two senators agreed that a study 
of the matter could be conducted at the time that a tem 
porary program might be put into place. Their exchange 
helps to convey the spirit of that time:
Mr. Byrd of West Virginia: Mr. President, I would 
like to ask the able Senator from New Jersey a 
question as to what consideration, if any, was given 
to the possibility of having provisions included in 
the bill which would provide compensation for 
miners suffering from black lung who do not 
qualify for compensation under State law.
The reason I ask the question is that I have been 
very interested in legislation which would provide 
for compensation to miners suffering from 
pulmonary diseases who are not covered by State 
statute. In West Virginia there are many miners 
suffering from black lung and other pulmonary 
diseases who do not qualify under State statutes for 
compensation.
With this in mind, I gave considerable time to the 
development of proposed legislation which would 
provide Federal assistance in this area. I was able to 
work with Washington headquarters of the United 
Mineworkers of America in developing a proposed 
bill which would provide Federal assistance over a 
period of 20 years, with the Federal assistance 
decreasing, I believe, in the amount of 5 percent a 
year and the States picking up the additional costs 
annually, but with no cost to the coal industry. I 
have felt that if the Federal Government could pro 
vide assistance along this line, without additional 
cost to the industry, we would not incur the opposi 
tion of the industry, which is already heavily
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burdened with overhead costs: but, at the same 
time, the Federal Government would be assuming 
some responsibility in this area, and I think it 
should assume such responsibility.
So it was with the advice and counsel and 
assistance of Mr. George Titler, vice president, and 
other officials of the United Mineworkers of 
America, that I was able to prepare the proposed 
legislation, and my senior colleagues, Senator Ran 
dolph, and I joined in co-sponsoring it.
As the able Senator from New Jersey will recall, I 
appeared before his subcommittee and testified in 
support of this measure. My first question, 
therefore, is, Was consideration given in the sub 
committee deliberations to adding provisions deal 
ing with compensation?
My second question is, What are the prospects 
for such legislation at this point being added by 
way of an amendment to this bill?
My third question is, If such prospects are not 
good, what encouragement or assurance could the 
able Senator give to the Senator from West Virginia 
as to the prospects for such legislation in the near 
future?
Mr. Williams of New Jersey: First, the commit 
tee did not have before it any proposed legislation 
dealing exclusively with workmen's compensation 
for black lung disease, pneumoconiosis. One of the 
bills, S. 1094, although it included provisions on 
this subject, had health and safety as its major 
thrust, I believe I am accurate when I state by 
recollection that the first time the attention of the 
committee was directly drawn to the need for com-
Development of the Act 17
pensation for men disabled by black lung disease 
was by the junior Senator from West Virginia (Mr. 
Byrd). Of course, it was my personal feeling as 
chairman of the subcommittee that this certainly 
should receive careful attention and, so far as the 
chairman was concerned, most sympathetic con 
sideration.
As we continued our hearings and deliberations 
on the safety and health measure, we did not deal in 
any comprehensive way with this particular ap 
proach of compensation for the disease. As 
necessary as it is, it was not dealt with at that point 
to the extent that we were able to include it in the 
pending bill.
So far as amendments here are concerned, it 
would seem to me that it is now established that this 
disease, without preadventure, is associated with 
the dust in the coal mining process, that it is disabl 
ing, and that it should be a compensable disease.
I would believe that our committee responsibility 
should be to consider it in depth. In the meantime, 
if there were a way to deal with this temporarily 
through a measure to bring disability payments to 
men disabled by the disease, certainly I would try to 
find, even now, a way to deal with the emergency in 
a temporary fashion looking toward a comprehen 
sive long-range program of compensation for men 
disabled by pneumoconiosis.
Mr. Byrd of West Virginia: Mr. President I 
thank the able Senator for his response. I under 
stand his answer to be that it is quite possible that 
consideration might be given on the floor of the 
Senate to language which would establish a short-
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term program to assist coal miners who suffer from 
pulmonary diseases and who do not qualify under 
State statutes. Am I correct?
Mr. Williams of New Jersey: That is what I tried 
to convey to the Senator, yes. 20
The following day, the two senators from W. Virginia met 
with the very powerful chairman of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor, Representative Carl Perkins of Ken 
tucky. The senior Senator, Randolph, introduced amend 
ments to S 2917, co-sponsored by Senator Byrd. One of these 
(Amendment #211), extended a federal workers* compensa 
tion law, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com 
pensation Act to coal miners not covered by a state workers' 
compensation law. The law was to become effective two 
years after the 31st day of December that followed the enact 
ment of the law. It would provide compensation to miners 
who were disabled or died as a result of "respiratory 
disease," and whose state workers' compensation law did 
not "contain provisions substantially the same" as those 
contained in the Longshore Act. Benefits would be paid by 
the mine operators under insurance arrangements; however, 
where this was not done, the Secretary of Labor would make 
payments from an Employees' Benefit Fund (Sec. 714). The 
fund would be repaid by having the Secretary of Labor ob 
tain the money from "the employer of the injured 
employee," but the amendment also provided for funding 
through general revenues (Sec. 714 (F) (4)).
This amendment also called for the Employees' Benefit 
Fund to pay benefits in cases where the miner or survivor 
had not received compensation previously, but would have 
been able to if the provisions in the amended Longshore Act 
had applied at the time. Thus, "old" cases were to be 
covered under this amendment, though compensation was to 
be paid only for the period of time after the effective date of 
the law.
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Senators Randolph, Byrd, Javits, Williams and Yar- 
borough co-sponsored Amendment #212, introduced at the 
same time as #211. It represented a significant compromise 
from 211 and in several ways showed the imprint of Senator 
Javits, one of whose goals was to keep temporary any federal 
benefits program for black lung. This amendment called for 
the states to administer a black lung program with funds pro 
vided from the federal trust fund established in the proposed 
law. The states would receive and adjudicate claims based on 
standards issued by the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare. Benefits were to be paid to either of two types of 
claimants. First, benefits were to be paid to "any coal miner 
who is totally disabled and unable to be gainfully employed 
on the date of enactment of this Act due to complicated 
pneumoconiosis which arises out of, or in the course of, his 
employment in one or more of the Nation's coal mines." 
(Sec. 106) The second category of potential beneficiaries was 
"widows and children of any miner who, at the time of his 
death, was totally disabled and unable to be gainfully 
employed due to complicated pneumoconiosis arising out of, 
or in the course of, such employment." (Sec. 106)
Amendment 212 described the time horizon for this pro 
gram as "a temporary and limited basis, interim emergency 
health disability benefits. ..." (Sec. 106) Several elements 
stand out in this proposal. First, benefits were limited to old 
cases only, that is, where disability had already occurred 
prior to the enactment of the law. Benefits would cease to be 
paid by the federal Trust Fund by June 30,1972 at the latest, 
with the states taking responsibility thereafter. The terms 
temporary, limited and emergency are sprinkled throughout 
the amendment. Death benefits were to be paid regardless of 
the cause of death, so long as the miner was totally disabled 
and unable to be gainfully employed at the time of death and 
was suffering from complicated pneumoconiosis. Similarly, 
benefits for living miners also were limited to the relatively
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few persons who were unable to work and were totally 
disabled due to complicated pneumoconiosis. Of note also is 
the terminology used, "arising out of or in the course of 
employment," a phrase that appears in every state's 
workers' compensation law. (In virtually every state, 
however, the word and appears in place of the word or.) This 
clearly tagged the law as a piece of workers' compensation 
legislation.
After a series of further amendments, compromises and a 
resolution of the major issue that delayed matters in the 
Senate, i.e., its authority to legislate a revenue-raising 
measure not initiated by the House of Representatives, the 
Senate passed a black lung amendment on September 30, 
1969. The vote was 91-0 in favor of the amendment, which 
carried Senator Randolph's name, with nine senators not 
voting. This Senate version was Title V, Interim Emergency 
Coal Mine Health Disability Benefits, and was incorporated 
in the act that passed the Senate unanimously on October 2, 
1969.
On September 23, Congressmen Dent, Perkins, Burton 
and 22 others introduced HR 13950, their proposed version 
of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. It followed months 
of work and debate within the House Labor Subcommittee. 
By October 3, 1969, the bill emerged from the House Com 
mittee on Education and Labor without amendment and had 
83 sponsors. Section 112 of this bill dealt with compensation 
for death or total disability due to complicated 
pneumoconiosis.
Basically, it provided that general revenues would be pro 
vided by the U.S. Treasury to fund either grants to states or 
direct payments to beneficiaries by the Secretary of Labor 
where no agreement was made with a state. Payments were 
to be for retroactive cases and not for prospective ones. The 
compensation provision passed in committee by a vote of 25
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to 9. In reporting on the bill, the committee made a point of 
describing section 112 as follows:
This program of payment ... is not a workmen's 
compensation plan. It is not intended to be so and 
it contains none of the characteristic features which 
mark any workmen's compensation plan. 
Moreover, it is clearly not intended to establish a 
federal prerogative or precedent in the area of 
payments for the death, injury or illness of 
workers. These provisions of the bill are a limited 
response in the form of emergency assistance to the 
miners who suffer from, and the widows of those 
who have died with, complicated 
pneumoconiosis. 2 1
Yet, in justifying the section the committee appeared to con 
tradict itself:
One of the compelling reasons the committee found 
it necessary to include this program was the failure 
of the States to assume compensation respon 
sibilities for the miners covered by this program. 
State laws are generally remiss in providing com 
pensation for individuals who suffer an occupa 
tional disease as it is, and only one state—Penn 
sylvania—provides retroactive benefits to in 
dividuals disabled by pneumoconiosis."
The House version used the traditional workers' compen 
sation phraseology, ". . .arising out of or in the course of 
employment." (Sec. 112 (G) (1)) In that sense, the section 
looked something like a compensation act.
The bill was explicitly limited to workers employed in 
underground mines. It contained a rebuttable presumption 
that if a worker with complicated pneumoconiosis is or was 
employed for 10 years or longer in a coal mine, then the
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disease arose out of or in the course of employment. 
Moreover, all persons with complicated pneumoconiosis 
were deemed to be totally disabled.
Ten members of the Committee dissented from the ma 
jority's position on the bill. (Actually 12 did, but 2 of these 
supported section 112.) Several reasons for their dissatisfac 
tion with the compensation provision were given. The core 
of their argument, however, was that such legislation 
represented a threat to state workers' compensation laws by 
providing a federal program where none had existed before. 
"We believe that the long-standing and ever improving State 
system of workmen's compensation will be in serious danger 
of ultimate reduction to a mere subordinate appendage of a 
federalized system of workmen's compensation or even of 
complete elimination.""
In one dissent, a compensation administrator from Maine 
who had testified earlier on the bill for the association of 
state workers' compensation administrators, the Interna 
tional Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Com 
missions (IAIABC), was quoted as saying:
The bills under consideration call for abandonment 
of our 55 year-old workmen's compensation 
system. (And,) The health, safety, and well-being 
of all workers, with few exceptions, is a matter of 
state concern. Workmen's compensation ad 
ministration is a professional specialty demanding 
experience and dedication and an intimate 
knowledge of local problems. This proposed 
legislation would replace local control with a cen 
tralized administration impairing development in 
the various regions of this country. 24
That opposition to black lung legislation arose over the 
mere creation of a new compensation program was not sur-
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prising. Workers' compensation programs in the states pro 
vided the livelihood for many persons in the legal and health 
professions, for segments of the insurance industry and for 
state administrators. A growing federal involvement posed a 
legitimate threat to these groups at a time when federal pro 
grams were rapidly expanding into a host of areas once left 
to the states. It is a testimonial to the strength of these in 
terest groups that so much of the opposition to the Coal 
Mine Health and Safety Act was directed at this one small 
piece of the proposed law, and that it was directed at the 
principle of compensation much more than at the details of 
it. As stated on the floor of the House by Congressman 
Scherle of Iowa in seeking to rid the bill of Section 112, the 
compensation provision, "If this section is not struck, it will 
be the first step toward the ultimate federalization of all 
workmen's compensation." 23
One of the specifics in the law that did occupy lawmakers 
was the bill's funding. Several issues were critical for them. 
The difficulties of the coal industry in the years preceding 
1969 were certainly well known to senators and congressmen 
from coal mining areas. Consequently, they hoped to avoid 
putting much of the burden of financing the benefits section 
of the law on the industry, especially at a time where the 
health and safety aspects of the law were certain to drive up 
production costs and reduce productivity in mines. Since 
black lung was thought to be exclusively a problem of the 
underground mines, a tax levied on coal production would 
shift some of the cost burden onto the surface mines, thereby 
relieving some of the potential costs to the underground sec 
tor. It would mean also that less of a competitive edge would 
be given to the surface mines vis-a-vis the underground 
mines. However, many of the black lung supporters in the 
Congress from states such as Kentucky, Pennsylvania and 
West Virginia were eager to have benefits paid out of general 
revenues of the U.S. Treasury.
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On October 29, 1969, HR 13950 was debated on the floor 
of the House. Congressman Scherle of Iowa sought to 
amend it by dropping the compensation provision, Section 
112. After that failed by a voice vote, he moved to have the 
bill recommitted, however that effort failed also. This led 
immediately to a vote on the bill, which passed 389-4. In an 
editorial, The New York Times applauded the action of the 
House and then predicted, "The Conference Committee 
should have a relatively easy task of reconciling the two ver 
sions now that both chambers have made clear their refusal 
to be sidetracked by the once omnipotent industry 
lobbyists." 26 This proved to be one of many predictions 
made about the program that later proved to be completely 
wrong.
In November of 1969, conferees from the House and 
Senate met in order to reconcile the differences in the bills 
passed by each house. What emerged was S 2917, a version 
that looked significantly different from either of the versions 
that had earlier passed in both chambers. Indeed, the dif 
ferences were great enough for John Erlenborn, the ranking 
Republican in the House Committee that fashioned the bill, 
to ask on a point of order for the Speaker of the House to 
rule that the conference report not be accepted. The grounds 
for such a decision would have been that the final version of 
the law amended matters that had not been in disagreement 
in the House and Senate versions. Erlenborn's point of order 
was overruled, thereby setting up the vote in the House on 
the conferees' version of the bill.
Erlenborn's position had been a difficult one. His work on 
the Coal Mine Health and Safety law had been substantial 
and had led to a number of compromises by the majority. In 
exchange for that, Erlenborn had supported the bill in 
cluding the black lung compensation provisions (Section 
112). However, from his perspective the bill which was
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returned from conference to the House of Representatives 
had been substantially undermined. According to him, the 
conference made at least seven changes in areas where the 
two versions previously passed were not in conflict and that 
changed the law substantially. Foremost among these, 
although both houses had provided only for the compensa 
tion of complicated pneumoconiosis, the conference 
stipulated that benefits were for the far broader coverage of 
"diseases of the lung caused by dust." Thus compensation 
could be paid, presumably, for a wide range of diseases in 
cluding simple pneumoconiosis, a condition that was far 
more prevalent than complicated pneumoconiosis.
Another important change was to obligate the coal mine 
operator to pay disability benefits where there was either no 
appropriate coverage under the state's compensation law, or 
where the Secretary of Labor had not approved the provi 
sions of the state's law. It also added an obligation on mine 
operators to be covered under an insurance arrangement for 
such claims.
The conferee's bill also required the Secretary of Labor to 
pay for compensation where the mine operator was not in 
sured or if the mine operator was no longer in business. A 
mine operator would be liable to the U.S. Government in a 
civil action for recovery of these funds.
The anger expressed by Erlenborn toward the conference 
and its report as dictated by the majority Democrats emerges 
clearly in the record of the floor debate. Using terms like 
"underhanded," "travesty" and "behind scenes dealing," 
he and fellow Republicans, such as Steiger and Esch, who 
had previously supported the House black lung provisions in 
committee and in the House vote, demonstrated their sense 
of having been sandbagged by House Democrats such as 
Perkins, Dent and Burton. Unable to win on the point of 
order, Erlenborn moved to recommit the bill but lost by
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258-83, essentially guaranteeing the acceptance of the con 
ference version of the bill. All of the controversy was 
directed at the black lung compensation portion of the law.
As the debate about the integrity of the conference wound 
down, the remaining discussion focused on the cost of the 
bill. The Nixon administration had promised to provide its 
thinking on the legislation, but had never developed a 
coherent position on it. Only after the two chambers of the 
Congress had passed their bills did the administration begin 
to play an active role. Strong threats emerged that the presi 
dent might veto the legislation, partly on the matter of cost. 
Well after the Conference Committee had begun its work, 
and only four days before its final report was issued, 
Secretary of Interior Hickel wrote to Senator Javits, pro 
viding him with estimates of the cost of the benefits provi 
sion of the law. Based on the disability criteria used to deter 
mine eligibility, the Interior Department estimated that black 
lung legislation would cost between $155 million and $384 
million in the first full year of the program, and between 
$1.2 billion and $3.0 billion cumulatively for 20 years. 27 
HickeFs estimates were ridiculed by Carl Perkins on the 
grounds that they were provided hopelessly late in the 
legislative process, and for being excessively high, 
presumably for political reasons. Further, Perkins asserted 
that ". . .this legislation transcends petty arguments over 
costs." 28
Additional criticism of the administration's stance was ex 
pressed by Congressman Dent: "At one point a senator came 
before us (the Senate-House Conference Committee) and 
told us that the cost would be as much as $180 million. 
Gentlemen, if you took every miner in these United States 
and if you paid him $5,000 a year and bought his wife a chin 
chilla coat, you would not spend that much money. Finally, 
after a little bit of fact finding, he came down to $154 million
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and yesterday he came down to $124 million." 29 Dent 
estimated that compensation for living miners could not con 
ceivably exceed $32.3 million.
HickePs estimates were attacked by another of the legisla 
tion's primary movers, Congressman Phillip Burton. He 
charged that the last minute cost figures were". . .politically 
motivated and White House dictated ... an ignoble effort 
to deny any meaningful help to black lung widows and 
miners. . . ." 30
The administration provided virtually no support for 
Erlenborn and others who were fearful that the compensa 
tion provision had been carried too far. Ultimately, the Nix 
on White House argued simply that workers' compensation 
was a matter to be left for the states. In the absence of any 
leadership from the White House, the final bill was a 
creature of the Democratic majority in both Houses. The 
conference report was easily accepted in the House by a vote 
of 333-12 on December 17, 1969.
On December 18, the Senate took up the Conference Com 
mittee's report. Unlike the House, there was no disagree 
ment voiced by members of the Senate. Senator Javits ex 
plained how the compromises had been reached with the 
House members of the conference. All of the discussion was 
centered on the black lung provisions. Senator Williams in 
dicated that he anticipated that 50,000 claimants would 
receive federal benefits under the law. 31 Javits asserted that 
Secretary Hickel's cost estimates were wrong and that he 
estimated the cost of the program would be between $80 and 
$100 million and "certainly no more than $120 million per 
year." 32 The conference report was approved in the Senate 
without a roll call vote. It was signed by President Nixon, 
despite his previous threat to veto it, on December 23 and 
became law on December 30, 1969.
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The passage of Title IV of the Coal Mine Health and Safe 
ty Act was a tribute to the legislative prowess and doggedness 
of a few key members of Congress. None played a more 
significant role in shaping the final outcome than did Carl 
Perkins of Kentucky. While the legislation's most fervent 
supporters came from coal mining areas, there were at least 
three prominent exceptions, Congressman Phillip Burton of 
California, Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey, and 
Senator Jacob Javits of New York did not represent such 
areas. Support for Title IV was helped by the very prominent 
positions in the Congress held by certain senators and con 
gressmen from the coal mining areas. Senator Jennings Ran 
dolph, who sat on the Subcommittee on Labor along with 
Schweiker (R-Pennsylvania) and Taft (R-Ohio), had been 
chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee, earning 
for himself the sobriquet, the "Prince of Pork." The ranking 
Republican on the committee was John Sherman Cooper of 
Kentucky. Senator Byrd of West Virginia also served on the 
Appropriations Committee, and at that time had begun to 
climb the ladder of his party's hierarchy, serving as secretary 
of the Senate Democratic Conference.
In the House, the key Education and Labor Committee 
was headed by Perkins, who had served in the House since 
1948. Congressman Daniel Flood, representing the an 
thracite districts in Pennsylvania, was chairman of the Ap 
propriations Committee for the Labor Department and 
Health, Education and Welfare and was the speaker pro 
tempore. Congressman Hechler, a Columbia University 
Ph.D., was chairman of the Subcommittee on Advanced 
Research and Technology. John Dent of Pennsylvania held 
no special position of influence in the House, but his 
previous experience as an attorney, a former coal company 
executive, and a local union president (United Rubber 
Workers #1875) was helpful. Ultimately, there was little 
reason to expect much opposition to a bill that was pushed
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by such Congressional heavyweights and that appeared to be 
relatively cheap, if not innocuous.
Summary
The arguments introduced above are directed at showing 
the special place that mining occupied in the public percep 
tion. A combination of very high physical risk, growing 
dissatisfaction with state safety regulations, and economic 
deterioration in the industry meant that federal policy pro 
viding special treatment for the miners was not a surprising 
development by the end of the 1960s. In addition, this will 
ingness to give the miners some assistance or support must 
also be viewed against the backdrop of Lyndon Johnson's 
Great Society.
Beginning in 1964 and extending through the balance of 
that decade, a very broad range of public programs of cash, 
health care and other services and in-kind assistance was pro 
vided to specific clusters within the country. Targeted at 
groups from the unborn to the aged, at veterans, ex- 
offenders, the handicapped, Indians, inner-city residents, 
the rural poor and myriad other populations, the prevalent 
view appeared to be that government support could right all 
of the past ills of the society. By the late 1960s, miners were 
simply one group that had not yet shared much of this 
federal largess. Apparent shortcomings in state workers' 
compensation programs that uniquely impacted coal miners 
provided a potential opportunity, fortuitously, for Congress 
to demonstrate its beneficence. The federal government had 
an established history of enacting coal mine safety legislation 
after major mining disasters. Hence, it was hardly surprising 
that there was a major bill passed in 1969, following the Far- 
mington explosion. It proved to be a convenient vehicle for 
doing something that provided income to the coal miner 
community. The presumed need of the law arose from inade-
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quacies that were evident in state administered programs, 
both in terms of workplace safety and health, and in 
workers' compensation programs for occupational diseases.
NOTES
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their development, see Compendium on Workers' Compensation, 
prepared by C. Arthur Williams, Jr. and Peter S. Earth, National Com 
mission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, Washington, D.C., 
1973.
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